Abstract. Certificate-based encryption (CBE) combines traditional public-key encryption and certificateless encryption. However, it does suffer to the Denial of Decryption (DoD) attack called by Liu and Au. To capture this attack, they introduced a new paradigm called self-generated-certificate public key cryptography. In this paper we show that the problem of DoD attack can be solved with a new implicit and explicit certificates-based public key cryptography paradigm. More importantly, we propose a concrete implicit and explicit certificate-based encryption (IE-CBE) scheme that defends against DoD attack. This new scheme is enhanced version of CBE scheme and preserves all its advantages, i.e., every user is given by the trusted authority an implicit certificate as a part of a private key and generates his own secret key and corresponding public key. In addition, in the IE-CBE scheme trusted authority has to generate an explicit certificate for a user with some identity and a public key. We prove that our scheme is IND-CCA2 − and DoD-Free secure in the random oracle model as hard is to solve p-BDHI and k-CCA problems.
Introduction
In Asiacrypt 2003, S. Al-Riyami and K. Paterson [1] introduced a new cryptographic paradigm called Certificateless Encryption (CLE). The CLE scheme is an intermediate step between Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) schemes and Public Key Encryption (PKE) schemes based on traditional public key cryptography (see [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] ). In the CLE schemes, a Trusted Authority (TA) is involved in issuing user partial private keys computed from TA's master secret. The user also independently generates an additional secret value and calculates both the private and corresponding public keys. Even if a TA knows the user's partial private key, impersonation is impossible. In PKE approach, the message sender needs to retrieve the authenticated parameters from the Certificate Authority (CA), the user's public key, and the certificate signed by the CA. In CLE, the message sender also needs to retrieve the authenticated parameters from the TA and the user's public key, but not any certificate [5] . On the one side this last CLE feature allows to eliminate the third-party queries for the certificate, but on other side the lack of a certificate does not allow to identify the proper public key. As a result, the sender may choose a wrong public key, or even use another one which is never owned by the intended recipient.
Liu J. K., et al. [6] were the first to notice that a CLE schemes did not prevent a sender from encrypting a message using an incorrect public key and termed this feature as a Denial of Decryption (DoD) attack, since this possibly denies the recipient's opportunity to get a correct decryption result. In DoD attack the adversary cannot gain any secret information, but any authorised user is also not able to decrypt this information and get the normal service. The adversary can succeed to launch this attack since there is no checking whether the public key is associated with the proper person or not.
Unfortunately, the certificate-based encryption (CBE) schemes introduced by Gentry in 2003 [7] also do not resist the DoD attacks. Each user in the CBE scheme achieves a certificate from a TA. However, this certificate is a part of a private key, so that certificate is implicit and should be kept in secrecy. The secrecy of the implicit certificate means that the encrypting subject implicitly assumes existence of a certificate related to the recipient of an encrypted message. However, is this assumption correct in any case? No, because CBE scheme did not prevent a sender from encrypting a message using a public key which does not correspond to the recipient's identity ID for which the message is intended.
In the literature a few solution of the DoD problem exists (e.g., [6, 8, 9] ). One of the firsts belongs to Liu J. K., et al. [6] , which propose the idea of self-generated-certificate public key encryption (SGC-PKE) to address this problem. Same as CLE and CBE schemes, the TA in SGC-PKE scheme is trusted to only issue a partial private key after user's authentication. The underlying idea for the construction of SGC-PKE scheme consists of asking the recipient to use one partial private key to certify (to sign) the public key and only then to share a correct copy of the public key, while the second one to decrypt the ciphertext received from the sender. As a result, there are two full private keys, one for CLE and the other for certificateless signature (CLS).
It is noteworthy that other SGC-PKE scheme given by Lai, J. and Kou, K. [8] essentially instantiates above generic construction of Liu J. K., et al. [6] . In Lai-Kou's scheme the receiver and the TA must undertake a protocol before the receiver can sign its identity and public keys using private key. This last operation means that the receiver creates a digital self-generated certificate which binds the receiver's encryption key to its identity. Dent, A.W. [9] describes the certificate-chain certificateless encryption scheme that combines a SGC-PKE approach with a traditional public-key encryption scheme PKE. This scheme demonstrates that a PKI-based public-key encryption scheme with a certificate generated by the CA (Certificate Authority) can be used to instantiate a BSS certificateless encryption scheme [10] with receiver self-generated certificate.
The above-mentioned schemes have one fundamental advantage: they allow for the authentication of the receiver's identity and its public key. Therefore, if a sender wishes to encrypt a message, then the sender first checks whether the certificate correctly authenticates the encryption key for the receiver's identity. This procedure resembles a traditional public key encryption systems based on Public Key Infrastructure (PKI): the message senders still need to retrieve and verify the self-generated certificates. The only difference from the PKE approach is another certification process including the issuance and management of certificates. In SGC-PKE, the certificate is self-generated and managed by the receiver, while in the PKE, it is generated and managed by the CA. This last features cannot be rather treated as an advantage of SGC-PKE compared with PKE, because such SGC-PKE schemes do not allow building global encryption systems.
Our contribution
In this paper, we introduce a new paradigm called Implicit and Explicit CertificatesBased Public Key Cryptography (IEC-PKC) to defend against the DoD attack and propose a concrete encryption scheme (IE-CBE). This scheme preserves all advantages of Certificate-Based Public Key Cryptography (CB-PKC), i.e., every user is given, by the TA, an implicit certificate as a part of a private key and generates his own secret key as well as corresponding public key. In addition, in the IE-CBE scheme the TA has to generate an explicit certificate for a user with some identity and a public key. The purpose of this explicit certificate is similar both to the self-generated certificate in SGC-PKE and the one in traditional PKC. However, the main difference is that in SGC-PKE schemes two secret keys are randomly generated, while in IE-SK-CBE only one. The implicit and explicit certificates should be related with each other in such a way that no one, even the entity of those certificates and their issuer (TA authority) should not be able to recreate an implicit certificate using the explicit certificate.
Paper Organisation
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present a formal definition for the Implicit and Explicit Certificate-Based Encryption (IE-CBE) scheme and its security model. In Section 3, we present IE-CBE Scheme based on Sakai-Kasahara encryption scheme [3, 4] derived from CBE [12] schemes and provide a formal security proof of it in Section 4. The paper ends with conclusions.
An Implicit and Explicit Certificate-based Encryption Scheme

Generic IE-CBE Encryption Scheme
In this section, we present a formal definition for the IE-CBE scheme. The three main entities involved in an IE-CBE scheme are a sender, a receiver and a trusted authority chosen by the sender. The scheme uses bilinear pairings [15] and using notions similar to those presented by S. Al-Riyami, et al. [1] .
Definition 1.
An implicit and explicit certificate-based encryption scheme (IE-CBE) is the 7-tuple of algorithms which are defined in Table 1 . 
Cert ) is a valid public/private certified key pair.
Security Model
The security model should appropriately describe the real-world security needs to demonstrate that the scheme resists all practical attacks, but the model should not be so powerful that it would require to use overly complex and inefficient schemes in order to meet the security notions [9] . We require the IND-CCA2 [6, 8, 9 , 12] notion of security for the encryption scheme. This captures the notion that no attacker can determine any information about a message from a ciphertext even, if they can obtain the decryptions of any other adaptively prepared ciphertext.
The security model of IE-CBE scheme is modified version of the models proposed by S. Al-Riyami and K. Paterson [1] , A. Dent [9] , Lai, J., Kou, K. [8] and J. K. Liu, et al. [6] . According to these models, there are two types of adversaries. Type I adversary is an uncertified user, who is allowed to impersonate an arbitrary victim by changing his public key with other public key of his own choice, that the sender uses to encrypt messages, but does not have access to the TA's master-key. It can also obtain partial and full secret keys of arbitrary identities, and the certificates of all users except the certificate for the forged certificate information of the victim. Type II adversary is a malicious TA that is equipped with master-key and can compute the master public key value maliciously (see [9, 11] ), but is not allowed to replace public keys. The main goal of Type II adversary is to impersonate a victim with a given public key and without access to the corresponding secret private key chosen by the victim.
Typically, it is expected that the decryption oracle should be able to correctly respond to decryption queries made on identities whose public keys have been replaced by the Type I adversary and for which oracle does not know the corresponding private keys. However, such security model is to strong and does not reflect an attacker's reallife capabilities [9, 10] . In our IE-CIBE scheme we assumed that the challenger is not forced to attempt to decrypt ciphertext for which the public key has been replaced, if the corresponding secret key is not known. It is known as Type I − adversary [6] . A security model is typically presented as a game played between an arbitrary (probabilistic polynomial-time, PPT) adversary A representing given an encryption scheme and a challenger (who represents a new algorithm B which uses A as a subroutine and supplies the answers to A's oracle queries). The challenger keeps a list of users in the system and all TA-issued certificates, their real public/private key pairs, and the public key value that the sender associates with each user. The adversary interacts with the challenger via a series of oracles which force the challenger to perform certain operations and model the different ways that the adversary can interact with the system.
Definition 2 (IND-CCA2
− security, compare [6, 8, 9, 12] For security, in addition to IND-CCA2 − , we require the IE-CIBE encryption scheme to be DoD-Free. The formal security model for DoD attacks is defined as a game played between the challenger and a PPT adversary (DoD adversary), which has the same power as the adversary A of a Type I − . Definition 3 (DoD-Free Security, see [6, 9] ). We say that IE-CIBE encryption scheme is DoD-Free secure if no PPT adversary A has a non-negligible advantage in the following game played against the challenger:
Guess. The adversary
Setup. The challenger C takes a security parameter 1 k and runs the Setup (1 k ) algorithm. It gives A the resulting system parameters params and a random public key 0 P of the TA. The challenger keeps the master secret key TA s to itself. Queries. In this phase, the adversary A can adaptively issue queries to the same oracles which are given in Phase 1 to the adversary A of a Type I − (see Definition 2). − security model of IE-CIBE is a little different from the definition of the chosen ciphertext security model given in [8, 10, 12] . First, it contains two new queries on an explicit certificate extraction and its replacement, i.e., Cert-GenerateQuery and Certificate-Replace-Query (the Type I − adversary only), respectively. Second, the Type II adversary is challenged on a random partial public key of a user and the TA public key of its choice. Note that the Type II adversary is not required to show its knowledge of the matching private keys corresponding to these public keys. When using the IND-CCA2 − and DoD-Free games we can define the security for the IE-CIBE scheme.
Challenge. When the adversary
Definition 4.
The IE-CBE encryption scheme is said to be secure if it is both IND-CCA2 − secure and DoD-Free secure.
IE-CBE Scheme Based on Sakai-Kasahara encryption scheme
The IE-CBE scheme is constructed on the Sakai-Kasahara identity-based encryption scheme [3, 4] and is similar to the certificate-based encryption (CBE) scheme given by Y. Lu and J. Li [12] .
Full Implicit and Explicit Certificate-Based encryption scheme (IE-CBE)
The proposed IE-SK-CBE scheme consists of eight algorithms: Setup, Create-User, Extract-Partial-Private-Key, Certificate-Generate, Set-Public-Key, Set-PrivateKey, Encrypt and Decrypt:
Setup. For given security parameters 1 k and two cyclic groups (G1, +) and (G2,  ) of the same prime order q>2 k , a trusted authority (TA):
(a) generates P being a generator of G1 and chooses the bilinear admissible pairing given as 
Remark. When equations (4) and (5) 
and sends it to a recipient R.
Decrypt.
A decryption entity R reconstruct message m using ciphertext C.
(a) R calculates:
is a correct plain text corresponding to the ciphertext
IE-CBE scheme correctness
Assume that the ciphertext (8) with equations (1), (3) and (10) shows the following: 
Furthermore, it is now easy to prove the correctness of equations (4) 
IE-CBE scheme modification
Any certificate-based encryption (CBE) scheme contains an implicit certificate that is a part of a private key. Hence, it seems to be naturally to modify any particular encryption scheme based on both explicit and implicit certificate and produce a CBE scheme that can be proven secure. Assume that this is possible in our case and we may remove the Certificate-Generate algorithm form IE-CBE scheme. The resulting scheme is a new scheme based on an implicit certificate (let's name it I-CBE, Implicit Certificate-Based Encryption scheme). Introduced change requires to remove certificate verification (eq. 4) in the algorithm Encrypt and modify equation (8) , which will be as follows (compare with eq. 15):
Remark. It is easy to notice that a certificate R ID Cert in relation with the scheme I-CBE plays in the IE-CBE scheme a similar role to self-generated certificate in relation with the underlying CL-PKE scheme in SGC-PKE scheme ( [6, 8, 9] ).
IE-CBE scheme security
In the IE-CBE construction, the implicit and explicit certificates are based on a short signature scheme given in [12, 16] that security depends on a k-CAA hard problem (see Definition 1). It means that if adversary is not able to counterfeit an explicit certificate, then it is not possible to execute a DoD attack and IE-CBE scheme is secure as hard is to solve k-CCA problem. Because IE-CBE scheme depends on the underlying I-CBE scheme complemented with an algorithm Certificate-Generate, hence it is natural to divide its security proof into two phases: in the first it must be shown that I-CBE scheme is IND-CCA2 − secure and in the second that IE-CBE scheme is DoD free. A similar approach was used for a security model of SGC-PKE scheme [6, 8, 9] , where they first examine the security of CL-PKE from which the SGC-PKE developed, and then consider the DoD-Free security. In our case, we construct the IE-CBE encryption scheme from an implicit certificate-based encryption (I-CBE) scheme and an explicit certificate built on a short signature defined in [16] . The security of resulting IE-CBE scheme needs to show that the requirements of Definition 4 are met and thus following Theorem should hold.
Theorem. The IE-CBE scheme is IND-CCA2
− and DoD-Free secure in the random oracle model. To prove the above theorem, we first prove the IND-CCA2 security of the IE-CBE scheme (Lemma 1 and 2) and then show that IE-CBE scheme is DoD-Free (Lemma 3).
Lemma 1. The IE-CBE scheme is IND-CCA2
− secure if IND-CCA2 − secure is the underlying I-CBE scheme.
Proof. The definition of IE-CBE given in Section 3.1 is the same as the definition of I-CBE from Section 3.3, except for Certificate-Generate algorithm which is used to generate the explicit certificates. This certificates have no influence on the semantic security of I-CBE scheme (see equation (16)), but provide the DoD-Free feature of IE-CBE scheme only (compare Lemma 2). Hence, it is clear that IND-CCA2 − security of I-CBE scheme implies IND-CCA2 − security of IE-CBE scheme.
Lemma 2.
In the random oracle model, the I-CBE scheme is IND-CCA2 − secure under the p-BDHI assumption (p-BDHI problem, Boneh D., Boyen X. [14] ).
The proof of Lemma 2 is similar to the proof of [13] and it is run on the basis of the IND-CCA2 − game (see Definition 2), in which the oracle Cert-Generate-Query is not accessible and no longer needed, as challenger C cannot now generate certificates and the adversary cannot use them in any operation. Due to its length the proof is not included here.
Besides the IND-CCA2 − security property, we require additionally IE-CBE scheme to be DoD-Free secure. The condition that IE-CBE scheme should meet are defined in Lemma given below.
Lemma 3. The IE-CBE scheme is DoD-Fee secure, assuming that the implicit and explicit certificates are existential unforgeable.
Proof. In IE-CBE scheme, the implicit and explicit certificates are short signatures computed using a signature scheme considered in [16] . According to Theorem 3 of [16] this signature scheme is existentially unforgeable under chosen message attack (EUF-CMA) in the random oracle model, assuming that k-CCA problem (k-CAA problem, Mitsunari S., et al. [13] ) is believed to be computationally hard.
We now consider the DoD-Free game implemented with a Type I − adversary A (see Definition 3), in which the adversary A models an uncertified entity. Suppose that algorithm F is a forger that breaks the short signatures. We wish to construct another algorithm B that uses A with algorithm F to solve the k-CAA problem. The algorithm B receives the k-CAA instance (a challenge) with . As the algorithm B has access to the signing-oracle, hence B can answer all oracle queries given by A, including the queries for the implicit and explicit certificate signing.
When the queries phase of DoD-Free game is over, then the adversary A submits message * m and an identity *
